What is the Science of Learning

I think the most important thing to discuss first regarding the Science of Learning, is what this means, and how it will affect learning in the future.
Meltzoff, Kuhl, Movellan & Sejnowski (2009) discuss that the Science of Learning is using scientific research from psychology, neuroscience, and machine learning to better understand learning processes. These learning processes are then looked at further in regards to how they can be used to facilitate better learning. These findings can be used in a number of different disciplines, and during many different stages throughout a person’s life.

Furthermore, an article by Mayer (2010) discusses the importance of integrating The Science of Learning in Medical Education. Mayer discusses how words and pictures are very important to medical learning. This would be useful in subjects such as anatomy, where the information is based solely on memorization. Mayer also mentions that pictures and words are processed through different channels, which can lead to a stronger association, than if just one type was used at a time. Mayer also discusses that the Science of Instruction is also important. The Science of Instruction is how people can help other people learn, which includes three important goals, reduce unnecessary stimulus, focus on what you want to learn, and apply that learning to retain the knowledge. Mayer believes that by applying this knowledge, students in the medical field will learn easier and retain knowledge longer.

Hirsh-Rasek, Zosh, Michnick Golinkoff, Gray, Robb & Kaufman (2015) make the argument that many of the applications or “apps” available for technological devices are not tested or based on scientific research. Many of these apps are marketed as educational, but when looking at the actual app or the underlying mechanisms associated with learning, there is a gap. Hirsh-Rasek et al (2015) indicate that there are four pillars that should be met for an app to be considered educational. The four pillars are to promote active, engaged, meaningful and socially interactive experiences (Hirsh-Rasek et al, 2015). It is believed that use of these four pillars will enhance learning. Therefore, apps claiming to be educational should have a requirement to meet the standards of these four pillars, or another Science of Learning theory.

With the information I have provided, it becomes clear that the Science of Learning is based off of scientific research that can be measured and checked for accuracy. Because we have this information accessible, we should use it. It is reasonable to require all types and places responsible for formal learning to subscribe to, and use teaching techniques that are based on the Science of Learning. If all foal learning environments were required to implement aspects of the Science of Learning, learning and teaching processes would become streamlined and more productive. However, there is much controversy regarding this topic, as many of you may know from last class.

References

Hirsh-Pasek, K., Zosh, J. M., Golinkoff, R. M., Gray, J. H., Robb, M. B., & Kaufman, J. (2015). Putting education in “educational” apps: Lessons from the science of learning. Psychological Science in the Public Interest : A Journal of the American Psychological Society, 16(1), 3.

Mayer, R. E. (2010). Applying the science of learning to medical education. Medical Education, 44(6), 543. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2923.2010.03624.x

Meltzoff, A. N., Kuhl, P. K., Movellan, J., & Sejnowski, T. J. (2009). Foundations for a new science of learning. Science, 325(5938), 284-288. doi:10.1126/science.1175626

Is A Counter-stereotype Useful?

Well, I must say, I’m sad that this class is ending. At first, I wasn’t sure what to expect from this class, and I must say, I am thoroughly impressed. I really loved that I was encouraged to take charge of my learning, and study topics I am passionate about. Naturally, for me, many of my blogs dove into biases that are activated without our knowledge. I feel that these are very relevant to the work I plan to do in the future, counselling.

The one strategy that seemed to continuously come up was the use of counterstereotypic information to decrease stereotypes. Throughout this course, I have come across many studies that have tested this method, and have found it to be useful. One of the first studies I came across that used this method is a study by Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001). In this study, participants used counterstereotypic mental imagery to decrease implicit stereotypes. These researchers did a number of studies, which shows that this strategy is generalizable.

I ended up doing a comment about the Obama effect. It turns out that the Obama effect is based on the fact that Obama is counter stereotypical. An article by Columb, and Plant (2011) looked at how the Obama effect decreased prejudice against black people. I found this article to be the most interesting, throughout the entire semester. This could be due to the fact that I had no idea the Obama effect was a real phenomenon.

And finally, a comment I did just recently that looked at a study by Hu, Antony, Creery, Vargas, Bodenhausen, and Paller (2015) where sounds were paired with counterstereotypic information. These sounds were then played during slow wave sleep. The researchers found this experiment was effective in decreasing implicit gender and racial biases for a period of one week.

These studies can be very useful to show that counterstereotypic information can decrease implicit and explicit stereotypes and biases. As part of my own growth, I am going to implement this strategy in my own life, and I hope to see a decrease in my own personal biases. Thank you for reading my blog, take care.

References
Blair I. V., Ma J. E., Lenton A. P. (2001). Imagining stereotypes away: The moderation of implicit stereotypes through mental imagery. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 828–841.

Columb, C., & Plant, E. A. (2011). Revisiting the obama effect: Exposure to obama reduces implicit prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 499-501. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.11.012

Hu, X., Antony, J., Creery, J., Vargas, I., Bodenhausen, G., & Paller, K. (2015). Unlearning implicit social biases during sleep. Science, 348(6238), 1013-1015. doi:10.1126/science.aaa3841

Changing Our Implicit Social Cognition

In my three previous topic blogs I chose to focus on implicit social cognition. The first topic blog I wrote, focussed on implicit stereotypes. The next topic blog focussed on implicit attitudes. The final introductory topic blog focussed on implicit self-esteem. All three of those blogs discussed the effects of implicit social cognition on behaviour, making the point that these cognitive processes are active without our knowledge. After reading about how these processes are governing our behaviour unconsciously, you may be worried, and curious. If you are worried about not being conscious of some of these governing factors, self-awareness may be useful. Once you have realized the effects of these implicit beliefs, you can work on changing them. This blog will explain how to go about changing these implicit social cognitive processes.

The article by Elbert, Steffens, Stulpnagel and Jelenec (2009) discussed how pairing ideas to do with self with positive and ideas to do with others as negative could have an effect on changing implicit attitudes about self. More specifically, implicit attitudes can be changed through associative learning or classical conditioning. “In analogy to evaluative conditioning (EC), the target concepts in attitude IATs might act as conditioned stimuli and the attribute concepts as unconditioned stimuli.” (Elbert, Steffens, Stulpnagel & Jelenec, 2009, p.1101). Likewise, a study by Baccus, Baldwin and Packer (2004) discusses how implicit self-esteem can be increased through classical conditioning. This was accomplished in this study by pairing smiling faces with self-relevant information.

And finally, an article by Ramsey and Sekaquaptewa (2011) looked at the gender stereotype related to mathematics. The researchers found that implicit stereotypes that women were bad at math increased in both men and women over the course. In regards to females that believed in the stereotype, it was found that they had worse performance compared to women who didn’t believe the stereotype, and men; no effect on performance was found for men. So, the more the implicit stereotypes increased for women, the worse they performed. Therefore, the only way to remove this observed effect is to become conscious of the stereotype, and change they way we perceive women and math.

As you can see by the research I have presented, it is possible to change our implicit social cognition. It is first important for us to become aware of our implicit biases, then we can begin to change them. One way we can change them is through classical conditioning.

References

Baccus, J. R., Baldwin, M. W., & Packer, D. J. (2004). Increasing implicit self-esteem through classical conditioning. Psychological Science, 15(7), 498-502. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00708.x

Ebert, I. D., Steffens, M. C., Stülpnagel, R. v., & Jelenec, P. (2009). How to like yourself better, or chocolate less: Changing implicit attitudes with one IAT task. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(5), 1098-1104. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.008

Ramsey, L. R., & Sekaquaptewa, D. (2011;2010;). Changing stereotypes, changing grades: A longitudinal study of stereotyping during a college math course. Social Psychology of Education, 14(3), 377-387. doi:10.1007/s11218-010-9150-y
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Implicit Self-Esteem

For my topic blogs I decided to focus on implicit social cognition. As you may know, implicit social cognition is a type of social cognition that may work without your knowledge and you can not explicitly report it. My first topic blog was on implicit stereotypes. My second topic blog was on implicit attitudes. My final topic blog will cover implicit self-esteem.

A study completed by Risch, Buba, Birk, Morina, Steffens, and Stangier (2010) looked at the implicit self-esteem (ISE) in people with depression. The researchers were interested in whether negative self-views caused impaired ISE, and whether impaired ISE caused negative self-attributed to be activated long after remission of depression. This study relied on the Implicit Associations Test to measure implicit self-esteem. It was found that ISE was lower in participants with current depression. It was also found that participants with remitted depression, who had experienced three or more depressive episodes in the past, had lower ISE than participants who had experienced less than 3 depressive episodes. The implications for this study would be for treatment of people with depression. Treatment must also focus on increasing both implicit and explicit self-esteem. This will allow the patient to experience well-rounded treatment, which will hopefully result in increased chances of recovery.

A study completed by Rudman, Dohn, and Fairchild (2007) looked at implicit self-esteem compensation, and how that affects their behaviour in social situations. Participants experienced threats to their gender identity, implicit racism, and social recognition. It was found that participants experienced higher implicit self-esteem in conditions where they felt socially threatened. The researchers found that implicit self-esteem compensation in fact, did decrease after the participants engaged in self-affirmation. The researchers conclude that implicit self-esteem compensation acts as a damage control but causes impairment in social situations. They also state that implicit self-esteem compensation regulates anxiety in social situations. I think this could be linked to the idea of an ego defence. More specifically, when we are threatened (even just socially) our brains, and bodies have come up with ways to compensate for these to ensure we are not affected.

And finally, a paper by Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann (2010) discussed the ways in which implicit self-esteem is measured. Specifically, they discuss the efficacy and validity of two methods, the Implicit Association Test and the Name-Letter Test. The authors argue that neither of these methods are useful for measuring implicit self-esteem. They argue that the Implicit Association Test provides a more general implicit effect, that may not be reflective of ISE specifically. And, they also argue that the Name-Letter Test more accurately measures implicit egoism. Even though the authors argue that neither one of these methods work well to measure implicit self-esteem, they do not dispute that there are, in fact, parts of our self-esteem that we are either unable or unwilling to report.

From the above research, it is clear that there is agreement that implicit self-esteem exists, but that it is hard to measure because it is implicit.

References

Buhrmester, M. D., Blanton, H., & Swann, J., William B. (2011). Implicit self-esteem: Nature, measurement, and a new way forward. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(2), 365-385. doi:10.1037/a0021341

Risch, A. K., Buba, A., Birk, U., Morina, N., Steffens, M. C., & Stangier, U. (2010). Implicit self-esteem in recurrently depressed patients. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 41(3), 199-206. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.01.003

Rudman, L. A., Dohn, M. C., & Fairchild, K. (2007). Implicit self-esteem compensation: Automatic threat defense. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(5), 798-813. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.798

Implicit Attitudes

In my blog last week I discussed how implicit stereotypes affect our behaviour. You may recall that implicit stereotypes are the stereotypes that are active without our knowledge. This week I will focus on implicit attitudes and how they affect our behaviour.

In a paper completed by Rudman (2004), the author discusses four ways that implicit attitudes are formed. First, Rudman explains that our early experiences tend to shape our implicit attitudes, and that newer or more recent experiences tend to shape our explicit attitudes. She goes on the explain an experiment that found smokers’ implicit attitudes tended to be aligned with their first experiences of smoking (negative), but that these participants claimed to have positive explicit views of smoking. Second, she explains how the amygdala is active during experiments measuring implicit attitudes, therefore implicit attitudes must have an affective component. She discusses how priming based on emotions can have an effect on implicit attitudes. Third, Rudman discusses cultural anomalies in implicit attitude studies. Many studies have found that minority groups often implicitly rate dominant groups as more positive, but rate their minority group more positively when asked explicitly. She writes that these findings can be explained using the early experiences, and affective theories previously provided. And finally, the cognitive consistency principle also causes implicit attitudes. This principle is based on the idea that if I am good, and I am a woman, then women must also be good. These four theories are very valuable for us to understand the formation of implicit attitudes.

A study completed by Knutson, DeTucci, and Grafman (2011) looked at implicit attitudes present in a participant with acquired prosopagnosia. The researchers were interested to know if implicit social biases could be activated in people with prosopagnosia, because they cannot recognize familiar faces. The participant was asked to categorize faces explicitly by race, gender and political party using the Implicit Associations Test. It was found that the participant was slower to catagorize black faces compared to white faces, and an overall effect was found for race and celebrity IATs. These researchers conclude that implicit attitudes may be retrieved by using pathways that bypass the fusiform gyri. This information is useful because it shows us that these attitudes can be activated using simple stimuli.

A study completed by Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, and Blair (2014) looked at the validity of the Implicit Association Test, and if it even measures unconscious attitudes. In this study, participants were asked to predict their results on the Implicit Association Test. This study found that participants were able to predict their results with great accuracy, but could explain that this was not necessarily how they felt explicitly. It should be noted that there was low correspondence between the results for the IAT compared to the participants’ explicit self-reported attitudes. It was found that the IAT does not necessarily measure unconscious attitudes, it may simply measure what is more socially acceptable or dominant.

The above research describes phenomena, in which cognitive information is activated. This information then has an effect on our behaviour, because as you can see, people may not be aware of this information. Whether or not you think these are unconscious attitudes, or simply information that has been encoded by association, you must agree that it has an effect on our behaviour.
References

Hahn, A., Judd, C. M., Hirsh, H. K., & Blair, I. V. (2014). Awareness of implicit attitudes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1369–1392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035028

Knutson, K. M., DeTucci, K. A., & Grafman, J. (2011). Implicit attitudes in prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 49(7), 1851-1862. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.03.009

Rudman, L. (2004). Sources of Implicit Attitudes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13(2), 79-82. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uleth.ca/stable/20182915

Implicit Stereotypes

Many talks have focused on stereotypes and how they affect how we view others. I thought it would be interesting to focus strictly on implicit stereotypes, these are stereotypes that operate without our conscious knowledge. As you’ll see by the research I present, these stereotypes can further complicate relatively simple interactions.

A study by Banaji, Hardin, and Rothman (1993) set out to look at the effect of priming, and stereotypes have on they way we judge people. The researchers found that when participants were exposed to primes associated with aggression, they tended to rate men as more aggressive than did participants exposed to neutral primes. In regards to women and aggression, no effect was found between participants exposed to aggression-associated primes compared to participants exposed to neutral primes. These researchers also looked at the effect of dependence primes. Participants exposed to dependence primes tended to rate women as more dependant than did participants who were exposed to neutral primes. The researchers found an interesting phenomenon when evaluating the effect of dependence primes in regards to men. Participants tended to rate men as less dependant than did participants exposed to neutral primes. The researchers conclude that judgement is not affected when the target person is inconsistent with the stereotype presented (expect in the study with men and dependence), and judgement is affected when the target person is consistent with the stereotype presented.

Furthermore, a study completed by Moskowitz, Stone and Childs (2012) looked at the effects of implicit stereotypes on the diagnosis and treatment of African Americans. In part one of the study, the researchers collected information on what diseases and illnesses were associated with African Americans. These diseases were then divided into two categories, diseases caused by genetics, and diseases caused by the environment. This distinction is important because if the doctors associate the genetic diseases with African Americans, their associations would be accurate. However, that does not excuse the fact that some doctors allow stereotypes to guide how they diagnose and treat patients. These stereotypes can cloud judgement, and cause doctors to misdiagnose patients because they are so caught up in these stereotypes. The researchers found that doctors responded faster to conditions with an environmental effect. The researchers discuss that this effect could be due to unfamiliarity of the genetic conditions, or their long names. Either way, these findings suggest that implicit stereotypes may have an effect on the diagnosis and treatment of any person simply because of their race, sexuality, and gender.

So you’re think, “great, these implicit stereotypes affect how I view and treat people, without my knowledge. I have no effect on how I react, I’m completely screwed.” Guess what? You aren’t screwed! I found a study by Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001) that looked at the effects of mental imagery on the reduction of implicit stereotypes. This study had participants imagine counter stereotypes (a strong woman) and found that this mental imagery decreased the participants stereotypic responses. The researchers also looked at the effect of suppression of stereotypes, and simply imagining the stereotypes on how the participant viewed the target. It was found that by imagining the stereotype actually increased the stereotypic view of the target. Suppression of stereotypic thoughts did not show to decrease the stereotype.

As you can now see, implicit stereotypes affect how we interact with others, without our knowledge. But, you can change how these implicit stereotypes affect your judgement.

References

Banaji, M. R., Hardin, C. D., & Rothman, A. J. (1993). Implicit stereotyping in person judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 272–281. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.272

Blair I. V., Ma J. E., Lenton A. P. (2001). Imagining stereotypes away: The moderation of implicit stereotypes through mental imagery. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 828–841.

Moskowitz, G. B., PhD., Stone, J., PhD., & Childs, A., M.A. (2012). Implicit stereotyping and medical decisions: Unconscious stereotype activation in practitioners’ thoughts about african americans. American Journal of Public Health, 102(5), 996-1001. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1009903769?accountid=12063

Social Cognition and Social Discrimination

You’ve probably heard the term discrimination a multitude of times throughout your lifetime. I thought it would be interesting to look at the link between social cognition and social discrimination. Discrimination is defined as an inequality between people based on illness, disability, religion, and sexual orientation. But discrimination is not limited to only these only types, many other types exist. Discrimination happens because of an “us vs them” mentality.

An article completed by Bhugra (2016) discusses the discrimination that people with mental illness face. They talk of the stigma association with mental illness. Stigma is when the majority of society disapproves of a condition, or the way someone lives their life. Social stigma reinforces the “us vs them” mentality and further increases the discrimination a person or group of people experience. The researchers make the point that social discrimination is increasing for all groups. They also discuss about how unequal societies have higher rates of mental illness incidence. This could be due to the higher rate of unmet social expectations, which causes poor self-esteem and self-image. Poor self-esteem, which is one aspect of our implicit social cognition, has been linked to the development of some mental illnesses.

Furthermore, an article by Rowley, Burchinal, Roberta and Zeisel (2008) discussed the cognitive expectation of discrimination in African American middle school students. More specifically, the researchers looked at how racial identity and social context predicted the student’s expectation of racial discrimination. This study found that expectations of future discrimination declined from grades 3 to 5. They also found that African American students with more African American friends tended to have higher expectations of future discrimination, than did student with equal or more European American friends. If the student’s race was of high importance to them in regards to self concept and identity, the expectation of future discrimination increased. The researchers offer an explanation for this increase in expectation for discrimination, they theorize that parent socialization could increase the expectation for discrimination. Perhaps if the parents have experienced discrimination, they could have tried to explain to the children that discrimination might be an issue that they are faced with.

Another study by Chao and Willaby (2007) discusses the implications of implicit social cognition causing workplace discrimination. Prejudice and stereotypes can affect an individual’s behaviour without their knowledge, this can lead to workplace discrimination. These implicit cognitive biases can cause severe negative repercussions, like job loss, or legal issues. The problem with these implicit biases is that because we may not be aware of them, it may be hard to change them. This article discusses two options for avoiding or eliminating the risk for possible discrimination when selecting applicants for hire, blinding, and consciousness raising. Blinding is a practice that consists of concealing traits that people commonly use to discriminate. And, consciousness raising consists of drawing attention to the potential for discrimination. The researchers did reference an article that had mentioned that blinding had success in the past in regards to hiring practices of musicians for orchestras.

The present research shows a strong link between social discrimination and social cognitive processes, more specifically implicit social cognition.

References
Bhugra, D. (2016) Social discrimination and social justice, International Review of Psychiatry, 28:4, 336-341, DOI: 10.1080/09540261.2016.1210359

Chao, G. T., & Willaby, H. W. (2007). International Employment Discrimination and Implicit Social Cognition: New Directions for Theory and Research. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 56(4), 678-688. doi:10.1111/j.1464-0597.2007.00317.x

Rowley, S. J., Burchinal, M. R., Roberts, J. E. & Zeisel, S. A. (2008). Racial identity, social context, and race-related social cognition in African Americans during middle childhood. Developmental Psychology 44(6), 1537-1546.

Reappraisal and Suppression in Emotion Regulation

A paper about the social, cognitive, and affective consequences of emotional downgrading by Gross (2002), discusses two types of emotional downgrading, reappraisal and suppression. Reappraisal is activated early on in the cognitive processing of emotions. Reappraisal is when you change the way you interpret an emotion-inducing situation to lessen the impact of the emotion. In social situations, reappraisal can make the social situation more enjoyable, and easier to navigate than suppression.
The second emotional downgrading technique discussed in the paper was suppression. Suppression is the internalization of feelings, as not to express them externally, and is activated later in emotional processing. The author argues that suppression is a less healthy way to downgrade emotions. Because suppression requires constant self-regulation, it can have negative effects on memory. This is because the scarce resources for cognitive processing are being used to constantly self-regulate, and cannot be used for processes like memory. In social situations, suppression blocks all emotional cues, not just the negative ones. This can make it hard for the person you are communicating with to judge the interaction. They may become uncomfortable. Not to mention, the constant self-regulation can leave us distracted from the interaction, which may have negative impacts on the relationship.

A study completed by Olatunji, Berg, and Zhao (2017) looked at reappraisal and suppression in regards to disgust and fear stimulus, and how those impact anxiety. Participants of this study were exposed to either fear or disgust stimulus videos. Participants were then asked to employ either suppression or reappraisal to regulate the emotions experienced. This study reports that for individuals exposed to fear content did not experience significant decreases in emotion when using either suppression, or reappraisal. With disgust content, participants experienced less distress when they employed reappraisal for emotional regulation. The researchers also found that physiological arousal varied by content, either fear or disgust, but no difference was found for the type of emotional regulation (suppression or reappraisal). This study found that reappraisal was useful for decreasing distress when participants were exposed to stimulus that produced feelings of disgust.

Furthermore, a study completed by Koval, Butler, Hollenstein, Lanteigne, and Kuppens (2015) looked at the effect suppression and reappraisal had on emotional inertia. Emotional inertia is used to explain emotions that are resistant to change, this is often caused by improper emotional regulation. Emotional inertia may be an early warning sign of depression. In this study the researchers found that suppression was related to higher negative emotional inertia and reappraisal did not necessarily lower negative emotional inertia. However, both suppression and reappraisal both increased positive inertia.

After reading the information presented, it makes sense that reappraisal would be healthier way to regulate emotions. But in very specific instances, suppression can be useful too.

References

Gross, J. J. (2002) Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. Psychophysiology 39. DOI: 10.1017/S0048577201393198

Koval, P., Butler, E. A., Hollenstein, T., Lanteigne, D. & Kuppens, P. (2015) Emotion regulation and the temporal dynamics of emotions: Effects of cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression on emotional inertia, Cognition and Emotion, 29:5, 831-851, DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2014.948388

Olatunji, B. O., Berg, H. E. & Zhao Z. (2017) Emotion regulation of fear and disgust: differential effects of reappraisal and suppression, Cognition and Emotion, 31:2, 403-410, DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2015.1110117

 

Get On the Bandwagon

You’ve probably heard the saying “get on the bandwagon” before and may or may not understand what that means. Well today is your lucky day, because I’m going to tell you all about it. The bandwagon effect is used to explain how trends, styles, activities, and attitudes become adopted because the majority are already engaging in and using these ideas. This effect can be active in many different fields in our everyday life, such as: internet challenges, anti-vaccination movement, fashion trends, and even in the way we choose to vote.

A paper completed by Nadeau, Cloutier, and Guay (1993) discussed and studied the bandwagon effect in Québécois people. More specifically, they studied the effects of the bandwagon effect on opinions based on two topics, abortion and constitutional future of Quebec. In the study the researchers asked participants how they felt about the above-mentioned topics, and either indicated a majority either for or against each topic, or participants were simply asked their opinion on the topics (control group). This study reports finding a 5-7% bandwagon effect for both abortion, and constitution future of Quebec.

Furthermore, a study completed by Stolwijk, Schuck, and De Vreese (2016) looked at the voting intentions and the bandwagon effect in the 2013 German Bundestag election. These researchers found that polls in the media, and how they were interpreted by journalists, had an effect on the voting intentions of people who had more exposure to them. These researchers also looked at the link between emotions and the bandwagon effect, more specifically, anxiety and enthusiasm. They found that anxiety and enthusiasm had an effect on whether the participants exposed themselves to the polls in the media, and the evaluations provided with them.

However, a paper written by Biddle (1991) discusses other explanations for increases in consumption of certain products, in this case, personalized license plates. Biddle discusses the idea of information diffusion as a useful explanation for increased consumption of personal plates. Information diffusion describes how information is passed through interactions. He claims that people only find out the they can have their own personal plate by seeing other people who already have them. I could see how this effect would have an impact in buying behaviour with relatively new products, however, I don’t think this explanation would be of use if the product was available for some time. Biddle also discusses habit formation as another explanation for buying behaviours. Habit formation is the phenomenon when people would prefer to continue doing what we have always done, instead of changing things. I find this argument much less appealing. It does not explain an increase in buying behaviour based on what the majority has at the moment. In the end, Biddle settles on the idea that information diffusion could be responsible for the increase in personal plate consumption, but believes that the bandwagon effect may still be at play in these scenarios.

After looking at the research, I must conclude that the bandwagon effect may have an influence on peoples’ behaviour and consumption. The more recent research shows support for the bandwagon effect.

References

Biddle, J. (1991). A bandwagon effect in personalized license plates? Economic Inquiry, 29(2), 375. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/200905276?accountid=12063

Nadeau, R., Cloutier, E., & J.-H. Guay. (1993). New Evidence about the Existence of a Bandwagon Effect in the Opinion Formation Process. International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique, 14(2), 203-213. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601152

Stolwijk, S. B., Schuck, A. R., & de Vreese, C. H. (2016). How Anxiety and Enthusiasm Help Explain the Bandwagon Effect. International Journal of Public Opinion Research. https://doi-org.ezproxy.uleth.ca/10.1093/ijpor/edw018

It’s Not My Fault!

Can you remember a time when you did poorly on an exam or paper? Do you remember what you said in response to that grade? Was it something along the lines of: “The instructor marks too hard.” “They weren’t clear on what they wanted.” “The exam room was too loud” When you should have been saying: “I was not prepared for the exam.” “I should have studied more.” “Now I know what to expect, I can prepare more before the next test.” This is an example of the fundamental attribution error. The fundamental attribution error is when attribute our behaviour to the situation, rather than accepting the role we had in the outcome, and attributing another person’s behaviour to their disposition (who they are as a person), while discounting any role the situation had in regards to their behaviour.

In a study by Maruna and Mann (2006), the implications of the fundamental attribution error are discussed in regards to criminality, more specifically treatment process of sexual offenders. They also describe how excuses impeded the treatment process in the current way of treating sex offenders. Right now, as it stands, sex offenders are required to admit their own role in the offence as a goal of treatment. As you can see from the above example, it is hard for individuals to see the role they played in the outcome of a situation. The article also draws an important connection between how we all attribute the outcomes to multiple internal and external influences, but we pathologize inmates for doing the same thing (Maruna & Mann, 2006). So what is it about the fundamental attribution error that makes us unable to see both sides?

Moran, Jolly, and Mitchell (2014) did a study to look at the parts of the brain that were activated when participants were presented with stories, while in an fMRI machine, and asked questions about the cause of the character’s behaviour. The researchers tried very hard to pick stories that produced an ambiguous cause to the character’s behaviour. Which in turn meant that individuals that attributed the character’s behaviour as dispositional, would be committing the fundamental attribution error. In the study the researchers found that particular parts of the brain were activated when the participant was making attributions regarding the character’s behaviour. The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the lateral temporal cortices were activated before the participants were asked about the cause of the behaviour. These areas are often associated with extraction of trait knowledge about behaviours.

The MPFC area of the brain is often associated with perspective-taking, meaning that this area would be activated if a person was attempting to look at the situation from another person’s perspective. However, Moran, Jolly and Mitchell (2014) found no activation in this area when participants made attribution about the situation rather than dispositional. Because no activation was discovered, they took that to mean that people did not actively engage in perspective-taking when making attributions about other people’s behaviour.

However, in another study completed by Brosch, Schiller, Mojdehbakhsh, Uleman, and Phelps (2013) an increase in activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) when information from the situation was included in the process of determining cause of other people’s behaviour. They also found no other areas of the brain that had increased activity when participants had made dispositional attributions. They claim that our brains must then automatically make dispositional attributions for another’s behaviour, and only when presented with additional information, do we then begin to categorize and use information to make situational attributions.

From my own perspective, I would have to agree that we start by attributing all behaviour to dispositional causes. This would allow us to make quick judgements about other people’s behaviour, and in turn, their intents. If we take an evolutionary perspective, this would be useful when we came across unfamiliar subjects.

References
Brosch, T., Schiller, D., Mojdehbakhsh, R., Uleman, J. S., & Phelps, E. A. (2013). Neural mechanisms underlying the integration of situational information in attribution outcomes. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 8(6). Doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst019

Maruna, S., & Mann, R. E. (2006). A fundamental attribution error? Rethinking cognitive distortions. Legal and Criminal Psychology 11. Doi: 10.1348/135532506X114608

Moran, J. M., Jolly, E., & Mitchell, J. P. (2014). Spontaneous mentalizing predicts the fundamental attribution error. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 26(3). Doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00513